A longstanding goal of the European Union (EU) is to promote efficient trading between price zones via electricity interconnection to achieve a single electricity market between the EU countries. This paper uses a power system model (PLEXOS-EU) to simulate one vision of the 2030 EU electricity market based on European Commission studies to determine the effects of a new interconnector between France and the Single Electricity Market of Ireland and Northern Ireland (SEM). We use the same tool to understand the effects of investment in storage, and the effects of the interaction between storage and additional interconnection. Our results show that both investments in interconnection and storage reduce wholesale electricity prices in France and Ireland as well as reduce net revenues of thermal generators in most scenarios in both countries. However, France is only marginally affected by the new interconnector. Renewable generators see a modest increase in net revenues. The project has the potential for a positive impact on welfare in Ireland if costs are shared between countries and remain below 45 million €/year for the scenarios examined. The owners of the new interconnector between France and SEM see increased net revenues in the scenarios without storage. When storage is included in the system, the new interconnector becomes less profitable.
Introduction
A longstanding goal of the European Union (EU) has been to create a single electricity market (European Single Electricity Market-ESEM). The ESEM has been in place since 2014, even if some Member States were allowed to delay joining the Single Market until 2018. 1 The framework for the EU internal market is contained in the Third Energy Package, which came into effect in March 2011, along with a detailed set of directives designed to put the single market in place. The goal of the ESEM is to promote efficient trading between price zones through increased electricity interconnection. 2 The integration of the electricity market is crucial to integrate renewable generation, enhance security of supply across zones and achieve price convergence.
The latter aspect is the focus of this paper, i.e. we use a unit commitment model to study the impact of a new 700MW interconnector between the Single Electricity Market of Ireland and Northern Ireland (SEM) and France on wholesale electricity prices, generators' profits, system CO 2 emissions and welfare changes in the two markets. 3 We investigate the impact of this additional interconnection on the European electricity system considered as a whole in 2030. Finally, we also evaluate the welfare impact of interconnection in the presence of increased battery storage.
Many studies investigate the effects of interconnection on parts of the EU electricity systems. Newbery et al. (2016) provide a survey on the benefits of market coupling in Europe and discuss extensively the benefits of interconnection on balancing market integration. Konstantelos et al. (2017) focus on the North Sea region and analyse the costs and benefits associated with interconnection expansion in the Scandinavian countries.
They find that increased transmission allows for better integration of renewables as it usually lowers the rate of curtailment, but can also lead to lower prices. Egerer et al. (2013) evaluates the welfare effects for the North Sea region of a grid expansion across Europe.
The authors use a welfare-maximization algorithm to compare the effects on consumers, producers and congestion of an European mashed grid and bilateral projects. They find that mashed grids are welfare improving at the European level but have not always positive effects at the country level. However, no costs associated to the investment in additional interconnection are considered in this paper. Pellini (2012) analyses the impact of higher interconnection between Italy and central Europe on consumers, producers and congestion.
She finds that market coupling is welfare improving if both demand and fuel prices increase.
Specifically on the interconnection between the island of Ireland and GB, SEM Committee (2011) shows that potential welfare gains associated with interconnection were 1 See Commission (2012) and Eirgrid(2016) 2 See Directive 2009/72/EC on common rules for the internal market and Regulation (EC) 713/2009, which established the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators. On the transition from regional to single market see: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2010_gas_electricity_ markets.pdf 3 The Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM) is dispatched considering the two jurisdictions together (the all-island system). More information on the Irish SEM can be found here: https://www.semcommittee. com/. On the relevance of unit commitment models in studying systems with large proportion of renewable generation see Shortt et al. (2013). in the magnitude of 30 €/million per year, without considering the investment costs associated with interconnection. Malaguzzi-Valeri (2009) focuses on SEM and GB and investigates the welfare effects associated to additional interconnection between the two jurisdictions. She finds that in order to achieve price convergence between the two markets interconnector's capacity should be at least of 500MW and that incentives for interconnection increase when technological differences between the two countries are large. Diffney et al. (2009) and Foley et al. (2013) study how wind generation in SEM could be better integrated with new interconnection between SEM and GB. They also find that incentives in new interconnection decrease with technologies in the two countries are similar.
Finally, focusing on the interaction between storage and interconnection, Evangelopoulos et al. (2016) provides a survey of the methods that can be used to investigate the relation between the two technologies. Pudjianto et al. (2014) analyse the interaction between storage and interconnection for Europe up to 2020. The authors find that if the two investments are undertaken at the same time, energy storage reduces the costs of interconnection. Both papers analyse the impact on storage and interconnection on system flexibility but so far, we are not aware about contributions that analyse also welfare changes disentangling the effects on consumers and producers.
Our paper add novelty to the existing literature in several aspects. First, it provides a sound analysis on costs and benefits for consumers, generators and interconnectors' owners. Second our analysis focuses on the island of Ireland and France, but models the EU electricity system as a whole. Thus, our work studies the effects of a new transmission line also on the net revenues of existing interconnectors. At the best of our knowledge this issue has not been studied in other works. Third, it analyses possible interactions between storage and interconnection at the EU level, comparing the welfare changes for France and the island of Ireland when both technologies are adopted.
Our results show that without considering investment costs, the additional interconnector between France and SEM, Irish consumers are better off and the benefits to consumers more than offset the losses incurred by SEM generators. French producers and consumers are not significantly impacted.
When estimating the impact of the additional interconnector on the returns to all interconnector operators, we assume that any costs or benefits will be evenly split between the two connected countries. In SEM, on average net benefits increase for interconnector owners. In France there is basically no effect for consumers and producers but the owners of the transmission lines between France and other EU countries (included the additional line with SEM) increase their net revenues.
We then consider the costs associated with the investment in the additional interconnection. This offsets the welfare gains for both countries. In particular, SEM is near cost neutral for the scenarios examined. France has positive gains in one scenario.
We undertake a similar analysis considering increased storage (0.5GW for SEM and 11GW for France, equal to the 10% of the assumed peak demand in both countries), to verify the combined effect on welfare of both storage and increased interconnection. We assume that lithium batteries are installed by the consumers, and we find that increased storage both with and without additional interconnection significantly decreases wholesale electricity prices in both countries. However, the sequencing and timing of investment may be important. If investment in storage is made after the investment in interconnection, then the consequences on welfare become uncertain.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 highlights the methodology, section 3 the data. Section 4 discusses the results of additional interconnection and section 5 shows the results with additional storage. Section 6 concludes.
Methodology
The software used to model the EU electricity market is the PLEXOS Integrated Energy Model. 4 .The PLEXOS software is available from Energy Exemplar. PLEXOS is a tool used for electricity and gas market modelling and planning. In this analysis, the focus is limited to the electricity system, i.e. gas infrastructure and delivery is not considered.
The methodology used to develop this European model is as presented in Collins et al. (2015) .
The model minimises the overall generation costs across the EU to meet demand at an hourly resolution and subject to generator technical characteristics. These include operational costs, which consist of fuel costs and carbon dioxide permits, and start-up costs, which consist of a fuel and a fixed unit start-up cost. Variable renewable curtailment levels are low in the model and no inertia constraints are imposed in the model. Model equations can be found Deane et al. (2014) .
In these simulations a competitive market is assumed across the EU (i.e. no market power and power plants bid their short run marginal cost) and we assume perfect foresight, whereby the model has full knowledge of all input variables such as demand and variable renewable generation output. This hypothesis does not allow us to investigate the potential beneficial effects of competition in mitigating anti-competitive behaviour in the two markets, as noted by Neuhoff et al. (2005) . However, the regulation of the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM) guaranteed that the outcome of the market was quite close to the outcome with the hypothesis of perfect competition, as shown by Walsh et al. (2016) . The Irish SEM is currently under transformation, in order to become compliant with the EU targets for the ESEM. Here we assume that the transformation of the market structure does not affect market competition, but some concerns in this regard have been reported by Di Cosmo and Lynch (2016) .
We simulate the full EU interconnected electricity market for one year (2030) 
Data
The analysed power system is based on recent European Commission modelling of a Ref- The paper also investigates the welfare effects of increased storage and how it interacts with interconnection. 8 To determine the impact of increased levels of variable renewable generation, we need to set specific levels of CO 2 emission permit prices and fuel costs. Table 1 . Generators' costs are determined from the fuel costs, the emission costs and the average heat rate. 9 Average production costs inclusive of CO 2 for SEM and France are shown in Table 2 are based on three different fuel cost scenarios.
5 Maximum capacity, minimum stable factors, ramp rates, maintenance rates, forced outage rates, start costs etc.
6 PRIMES is a partial equilibrium model that provides "projections of detailed energy balances, both for demand and supply, CO2 emissions, investment in demand and supply, energy technology penetration, prices and costs". The projections are set up in order to meet the EU targets on emissions for 2030:http: //ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/air/models/primes.htm.
7 The generation mixes of Switzerland and Norway are not included in the PRIMES scenario and were developed based on ENTSOE (2016) and Energiewende (2015) .
8 Battery storage included here is used to smooth daily demand peaks 9 Production costs for power plant type i, inclusive of CO2, are calculated as:
CO2 emission rates are 93.6 kg/GJ for coal, 55.9 kg/GJ for gas and 77 kg/GJ for oil.
European Commission has only one fuel price scenario, close to Scenario 2 (S2) we consider here. In order to allow the fuel prices to vary, we based our analysis on DECC (2016). 10 Gas and coal prices are assumed to increase between Scenario1 (S1) and Scenario3
(S3), driven by carbon prices, however increases are not proportional. In S1 the short run marginal cost of gas fired generators is lower than the short run marginal cost of coal fired generators. In S2, the short run marginal cost of both fuels is similar and in S3 coal fired generation costs are lower than gas, as shown in Table 2 . This has important implications for the dynamic of interconnector flows in each scenario. et al. (2016) . Localised hourly solar profiles for each Member State were developed using NREL's PVWatts ® Calculator web application, which determines the electricity production of photovoltaic systems based on system location and basic system design parameters.
Nuclear power has the largest share of the market in France, where in SEM natural gas is the main source powering thermal generation. Wind capacity is high in both countries, with 6.1 GW of capacity installed in SEM and 30.7 GW installed in France. However, once the percentage of capacity is considered in relation to the overall capacity installed, the impact of wind is much higher in SEM than in France, as shown by Table 3 . 
Network
Interconnection between Member States is modelled as net transfer capacities and no with two interconnectors for a total capacity of 900MW. As a result, the new intercon-11 On the absence of market power in the Irish SEM see Walsh et al. (2016) . 12 Some transmission lines have different export and import capacity. The full data set is available as supplementary information nection project between France and SEM almost double the interconnector capacity for SEM, but will only represent the 4% increase in interconnection capacity for France. 
Demand
Hourly demand for 2030 for each member state was developed by taking the historical 2012 hourly demand reported in ENTSOE for the EU-28 plus Switzerland and Norway and scaling it to 2030. We assume that peak increases by 10% in 2030, and we linearly scale the demand accordingly. In the Reference Scenario examined, electricity demand across the EU rises by 12% between 2012 and 2030. For the purpose of this study, demand is assumed inelastic with respect to price; as a result, we use the same demand independent of changes in price across all our scenarios. Comparing Figure 2b and 2d shows that the seasonal variation in the consumption of electricity for SEM is lower than in France. This reflects the shape of electricity demand in 2012 in these two countries. In SEM there are no spikes in summer as the use of air conditioning is very low. The French electricity system is quite electrified; as a result, spikes both during the winter and during the summer are more frequent than in the island of Ireland.
Results and discussion: interconnection
In this section we focus on the effects of the investment in a 700MW interconnector between SEM and France. Results with both additional interconnection and additional storage are presented in section 5. Added interconnection in our model increases price convergence between SEM and France. A brief overview of interconnector's flows of the three scenarios considered in this study with their implications is presented below.
Scenario 1 : In Scenario 1 (S1) the cost of generating with coal is higher than generating with gas. France is a net exporter of electricity, and the price differential between gas and coal drives the amount of exports to neighbouring countries such as Germany. In the baseline, without the additional interconnection between France and SEM, Germany has over 36GW of installed coal fired capacity representing 25% of installed capacity and net imports account for 7% of demand, with a capacity factor of 20%. Movements of the price of coal have a big impact on how coal plants operate. In S1, French coal plants operate at a capacity factor of 40%. With the inclusion of the IC to France, SEM becomes a net importer of energy from France for the portfolios examined, particularly in summers months when renewable generation in SEM is low and prices in SEM are relatively higher than in winter months. The imports from France reduce the wholesale electricity prices in SEM by reducing the full load hours and capacity factors of thermal generation. Moreover, Scenario 2 : In Scenario 2 (S2), the cost of generating with coal and gas is similar for all the countries. Coal and gas prices are close with gas being marginally cheaper than coal. In this scenario German coal fired power plants increase output significantly to a capacity factor of 78%. Exports from France to Germany reduce (approx. 50%) and Germany becomes a net exporter (albeit very small, less than 1% of its demand). Flows from France into the UK, Italy and Spain decrease (<5%) and S2 sees the lowest levels of exports from France across all three scenarios. When the IC to SEM is added there is little change to the IC flow dynamics between France and other countries. In SEM natural gas CCGTs plants see a 3% reduction in annual capacity factor from 51% to 48% with the inclusion of the IC. SEM tends to export to France in winter months when wind generation is high and import from France at other times.
Scenario 3 : In Scenario 3 (S3) coal prices are lower than gas across Europe. Germany increases coal plant output up to 43% in S3, and imports from France are reduced further, instead France exports to neighbouring countries with high levels of gas fired plant and low levels of coal capacity. The UK, Spain and Italy see increased imports from France compared to S1 and S2 . Overall net exports from France increase compared to S2 and S1(+14% in S3 with respect to S2). When the IC from SEM to France is added, Italy and Germany see a reduction of net imports from France. In Italy this reduction is compensated by an increase in gas fired CGCT's generation and in Germany a slight increase in coal fired generation is seen.
The following section analyses consumer surplus, the producers' and interconnector's owners' net revenues and the welfare changes from the "Baseline" scenario (without 700
France-Ireland interconnector) and the "IC" scenario. Table 4b shows the wholesale electricity price for all the scenarios with the additional interconnection ("IC") of 700MW between SEM and France, and without IC ("Baseline"). 13 The addition of the new interconnector reduces the wholesale electricity price in SEM by 4% in S1 and by 3% in S2, leaving wholesale prices almost unchanged in S3, when costs of gas plants are higher than coal fired plants. French wholesale prices are only marginally impacted. Table 4a shows the total expenditure in electricity in million of euro in SEM and France. The difference in the expenditure levels from the "Baseline" to the "IC" scenario is the consumer surplus associated with the investment in the new 700MW interconnector, defined as:
Wholesale electricity prices and consumer surplus
where h are the hours of the year, p i is the load-weighted average price either in SEM or in France (i) and L are the total loads. Our model produces results for all the EU countries, as described in section 3.2. However, jurisdictions outside SEM, France and Great Britain (GB) are only marginally affected by the additional interconnection, so results for those countries are not shown in the paper. 14 In S1, when the new interconnector is added, wholesale prices in SEM decrease by 3.9% with respect to the "Baseline". SEM sees a strong increase in both imports (+63%) and exports (+83%): exports are mainly in winter and imports in summer. This is mainly driven by wind generation, which is higher in winter than in summer, smoothing the winter demand's peaks. The consumer surplus reflects the price behaviour, increasing between 81
and 96 million euro in SEM in S1 and S2 and decreasing in France in S2. In S2 there is an increase in gas fired generation in France when the interconnector to SEM is added. This facilitates the exports to SEM, as gas cost in France is lower than in SEM (see Table 2 ).
Consumers in SEM benefit most (i.e. consumer's surplus is largest) when coal generation costs are higher than CCGT generation costs as in S1, as the difference between the cost of coal and nuclear is higher than the difference between the cost of gas and nuclear. Also the operation of CCGT's in SEM is least impacted in S1 with respect to the other scenarios, and imports from France tend to replace more expensive coal generation. This is not the case in S2 and S3 where smaller margins and an inversion of costs between coal and gas leads to a larger displacement of CCGT generation in SEM.
Due to model size and sensitivity we consider relevant only variations greater than 1%.
As a result, the interconnection between the island of Ireland and France does not change significantly the French prices and the French consumers'surplus.
We also analyse the impact of this interconnection on the GB electricity market as GB is connected with both SEM and France. Looking at GB, there is a small decrease in wholesale prices associated with a decrease in total generation costs. The added interconnector between SEM and France decreases the imports of electricity into GB from
France. However, the trade between GB and the other other countries (such as Norway and the Netherlands) slightly increases, making the indirect effects of the new interconnector between France and SEM very small for GB.
Net revenue
In order to understand who gains and who loses from the investment in interconnection we calculate the net revenue obtained by the generators and by the interconnection owners.
Here we consider a perfectly competitive energy-only market, so capacity payments or ancillary services are not taken into account in this analysis. Costs associated to the investment in the interconnector between SEM and France are not considered here, and counted separately in section 4.3.1.
Generators' net revenue
The generators' net revenue π is the sum of the net revenue made by each generatortypes (coal, biomass, wind etc)s either in SEM or France (i) for each hour h of the year.
The generator's net revenues π Gen in country i in each scenario ("Baseline" and "IC") are defined as:
where p i,h is the electricity price in country i, Gen s,h,i is the generation in MWh for each of the N generators in each country, T C s,h,i are the total costs of each generator-type s in country i for hour h, defined as: T C = (StartU pCosts + EmissionsCosts + F uelCosts).
We then calculate the difference in yearly net revenue (∆ π ) between the IC and the baseline cases.
where π Gen,i,IC is the net revenues made by generators in country i with additional interconnection and π Gen,i,Base is the net revenues in the same country without interconnection. Table 5 shows the net revenues aggregated over all generators in each jurisdiction, and Table 6 disentangles the net revenues between renewable and thermal generators. The "Baseline" scenario is in the first column, with the "IC" scenario in the second. Electricity generation by plant type both in the "Baseline" and in the "IC" scenarios is shown in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A.
Thermal generators in SEM end up with lower net revenues in S1 and S2, as the system imports more electricity from abroad and thermal plants are used less (see Table 5 ). In S1
this is most pronounced however in S2 and S3 this impact is softened as losses from gas fired generators (both CCGT and OCGT) are offset by increases in coal fired production and higher wholesale electricity prices. In France, net revenues do not change significantly (i.e. less than 1%) neither for nuclear nor renewable generators from the "Baseline" to the "IC" scenario. Net revenue for thermal producers reduces for France for different reasons:
in S1 production declines. In S2, wholesale prices decreases and in S3 generation costs are higher in the "IC" scenario than in the baseline, as shown in Table B3 in Appendix B. 
Interconnector net revenue
The new interconnector allows electricity to flow between SEM and France and in particular, SEM imports 1.5TWh in S1 and over 2TWh in S3. This reflects the fact that the new interconnector displaces the Irish thermal generation: the higher the fossil fuel costs, the higher the imports of electricity from France to SEM. With the Irish-French interconnector in place, exports from France to the other EU countries generally decrease by commensurate amounts in all the three scenarios. The interconnector operator's net revenue aggregated over all the interconnectors in a country is calculated as
in which i is either SEM or France and j are the countries interconnected with SEM or
France. In the baseline scenarios SEM is only interconnected with GB whereas France is interconnected with several EU Member States (Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy and Belgium). abs is the absolute value of the price differential between the two countries considered and h is the hour. Net revenues of French and Irish interconnector owners are shown in Table 7 . The columns for France show the net revenues of all the interconnectors between France and the rest of Europe, with the exception of SEM. The columns for SEM
show the net revenues of the interconnectors with GB. The final column ("SEM-FR")
shows the profits of the additional 700MW interconnection. When we calculate welfare changes by jurisdiction, we assign half of the IC costs and returns to the interconnector owner in each jurisdiction. 15 Table 7 . France has very moderate (but significant) gains from the new interconnection with SEM in both S2 and S3 (the gains are less than the 3% of the baseline in S2 and less than 2% in S3) and losses of less than 3% in S1. The small effect of additional interconnection in France can be explained considering that the capacity of the new transmission line (700MW) represents only 1% of 2030 French peak demand.
The baseline for France is different across the scenarios because of the complex dynamics of European interconnection flows linked to gas and coal costs. As described at the beginning of this Section, the relative price between gas and coal changes the role of France (from net exporter to net importer) for countries like Germany and Spain.
Welfare changes
It is possible to draw some conclusions on the total welfare changes in SEM and France for the scenarios considered in our analysis. We calculate the yearly welfare in the two 15 For simplicity, Moyle and EWIC interconnectors between SEM and GB are considered together. As a result, we split evenly also the net revenues of these interconnectors between the Irish and the British TSOs. This is a lower bound estimates of the net revenues of the Irish TSO, which owns the 100% of the EWIC interconnector.
countries following Malaguzzi-Valeri (2009). The welfare in country i (SEM or France)
in scenario j (without or with interconnection) is calculated as the sum of the interactions between the electricity price in the two scenarios and consumer's demand (consumer surplus), the generators' profits (losses) and the interconnectors gains (losses) as:
where CS is the consumer surplus defined in Eq. (2), π Gen,i is the generators' net revenue defined in Eq. (5) and π IC i is the interconnector's owner net revenue as defined in Eq. (5) Here we show the results for each jurisdiction: so the net revenue for the IC owners in each country is the total net revenue divided by 2, as we assume that interconnection's costs and profits are split equally between the interconnected countries. For simplicity, in the "IC" scenario we also include the profits made on the SEM-FR interconnector. We calculate the net welfare for both countries and report the results in Table 8 below: The monetary savings associated with lower emissions in both countries are already included in the producer profits so we do not take them into account explicitly in the welfare analysis.
In the next section we include the costs of building the interconnection and draw some conclusions on the benefits associated with this investment. Table 8 shows that without including the costs associated with the investment, interconnection is beneficial for SEM and not significant for consumers and producers in France, with the exception of the interconnector's owner, who has moderate positive gains from the investment project in S2 and S3.
In SEM, without considering investment's costs, the interconnector owner largely benefits from the project. Consumers are moderately better off in S1 and S2, producers are slightly worse off with the exception of S3.
IC costs
We take the ENTSOE 10-year Network Development Plan for 2016 to obtain estimates of the costs associated with interconnector investment. For France, the investment in new transmission capacity with SEM is welfare-improving 16 The report was accessed on 14 June 2017 at: https://www.entsoe.eu/publications/ system-development-reports/tyndp/Pages/default.aspx. We also checked the published reports of the 2016 network plan but in the published works available for 2016 the numbers for 2014 are confirmed.
17 See pg. 149. 18 The data can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1& language=en&pcode=tec00118&plugin=1 in S2. When costs of coal are higher or lower than gas costs the system dynamics make the costs of investing in IC equal or slightly higher than the associated benefits. In S1 welfare gains are reduced by the losses of interconnection owners (driven by lower prices in Germany and UK). As a result, the costs of additional interconnection, which are generally borne by consumers in the two jurisdictions, offset the benefits in this scenario. The same happens in S3, in which the cost of the project overcomes the welfare gains.
Results and discussion: storage
In this section we consider the availability of lithium batteries for the consumers. Batteries may help consumers in smoothing their consumption from peak time to other hours of the day (Schroeder (2011) and Díaz-González et al. (2012) ), leading to an electricity system where increasingly the "demand follows generation". We investigate how storage and interconnection between Ireland and France affect the welfare changes in these two countries and how these investments interact.
We assume that storage is equally available in all the 28 EU countries considered in our model, with a capacity of 10% of the maximum peak demand of each country. 19 This results in 0.5 GW of storage for SEM and 11 GW for France.
The choice of the storage capacity as 10% of the peak demand is quite arbitrary. This is a relatively simple method to simulate storage and will not reflect full system effects as it does not directly include a price response component (which is important with high levels of variable renewable generation) but provides a useful starting point in gauging the impact of storage from a system wide perspective.
We simulate two scenarios with storage, with and without interconnection, in order to capture interactions between interconnection and storage.
When storage is added to the scenarios it impacts more on the times of the day in which different plants generate rather than changing the overall generation mix. Across Europe, the net overall amount of exports and imports reduce between 5% and 8% in all scenarios with storage. An exception to this trend are Member States with high levels of coal and lignite, such as Germany, that tend to export more baseload power when storage is added. This is particularly true in scenarios S2 and S3 where the coal costs are almost equal to or lower than gas costs. In France the amount of net exports to neighboring countries reduces along with net imports. Increased imports from Germany are seen in S2 and S3 when storage is added. In the island of Ireland, net import and net exports reduce in all scenarios and this is to be expected as storage dampens price volatility and flatted price profiles. Table 9 shows the wholesale electricity price for SEM and France with storage in both countries. We compare 3 scenarios: the "Baseline" scenario (as in Table 3 ), the "Storage only" and the "Storage and IC" scenarios.
Wholesale electricity prices
In SEM, the electricity prices for the final consumers are lower with storage than in the "Baseline" scenario. Comparing Table 9 with Table 3 shows that the effect of storage on final price is very close to the price with increased interconnection. Finally, the combination of more interconnection and more storage gives the lowest prices regardless of the fuel costs.
As expected, in France the impact of storage (both alone and combined with additional interconnection) on electricity prices is stronger than the impact of additional interconnection alone in all the scenarios. Storage actively contributes to the reduction of wholesale electricity prices by smoothing the daily peaks.
The following sections examine the net revenues of generators and IC owners with storage. Then we calculate the welfare changes and include the analysis of the costs associated with the investment in storage and investigate the joint effects of storage and additional interconnection between France and the island of Ireland.
Net revenues
We calculate again the revenue by generators and by the interconnector's owner following Eq.(3) and Eq.(5). As in the previous section, the generators' net revenues do not include capacity payments and we assume perfect foresight in our model.
Generator's net revenues
With storage, in the SEM, thermal and renewable generators' net revenue decreases across the scenarios reflecting the lower wholesale prices. However an increase in the net revenue of thermal generators is witnessed in S1 due to an increase in gas generation at off-peak times to meet extra demand.
Thermal generation increases in France. The decrease of net revenues for both thermal and renewable generators are due to the decrease in the wholesale prices. Adding interconnection to the scenario with storage does not change the direction or the magnitude of the results for SEM. As expected, results for France are largely driven by storage, which is 10% of the peak demand instead of additional interconnection, which is less than 1% of peak demand. Comparing the baseline with the scenario with storage, thermal generation decrease significantly both in SEM and France. As a result, net revenues for thermal generators reduce strongly in both countries when storage is considered. 
IC net revenues
Here we compare the interconnector's net revenue in the scenario with additional storage and interconnection ("Storage and IC") with the scenario with only additional interconnection ("IC") discussed in the previous section and summarised in Table 7 . Comparing the two scenarios, the net revenue of the owners of the Irish-French interconnector decreases in the "Storage and IC" scenario with respect to the "IC" scenario. This result holds for both SEM and France. In particular, net revenues for the owners of the French interconnectors between France and other EU countries reduce when storage is added to the system. This is because in our model storage is added to all the EU countries and so each EU country is able to manage its own generation internally and requires less interconnection.
Irish interconnection owners see reduced revenues both on interconnectors with GB and on the new interconnection line with France. This suggests that interconnection and storage should be considered more as substitute than complementary technologies. In particular, this conclusion fully holds under our assumption of low curtailment of renewable generation in all the scenarios. Under different assumptions, both interconnection and storage may help integrate renewable generation in a better manner. Interconnection flows in the scenario with storage are about a third of their level without storage in S1, although they drop by only 20% in S3. When storage is included in the system and gas costs are lower than coal costs (S1), flows between SEM and France are equal to 0.5TWh, and to 1.8TWh in S3. Even if the flows in absolute values are lower than in the previous scenario, SEM is still a net importer and France a net exporter.
Welfare changes
To compare the welfare changes associated with the investment in storage, we consider the "Baseline", "Storage only" and "Storage and IC" scenarios. In the next section, we add the capital costs of storage and compare our findings with the results shown in section 4.5. Table 12 shows the absolute welfare changes in SEM and France with and without storage as well as the welfare changes associated with both storage and additional interconnection for S2. Results for S1 and S3 are shown in Tables C4 and C5 in the Appendix.
With storage, interconnector's owners and generators face reduced revenues both in SEM and in France. Consumers increase their surplus in all the three scenarios (S1-S3), as shown by Tables 12 and C5 , and this compensates (in levels) the losses faced by generators, leading to a positive welfare change in SEM.
France has a negative welfare change of -37€/million in S1 and of -20 €/million in S3 (see Appendix C). In particular, the reduction of exports in the presence of storage reduces the generation from thermal generators in France and reduces their net revenue.
Moreover, also the interconnector's owner reduce their revenues as the flows between EU countries decrease in all the scenarios.
Adding the 700MW interconnection between SEM and France in the scenario with storage (the "Storage and IC" scenario) increases the net revenues of the interconnector's owner, but the changes are only significant (i.e. higher than the 1%) in S1. As expected, there are not significant changes for French consumers and generators between the scenario with storage only and the scenario with both storage and SEM-FR interconnector.
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn by comparing the welfare changes in the two scenarios with interconnection (the "IC" and the "Storage and IC" scenario), shown in Table 8 and in Table 12 . First, the consumer surplus is higher in the "Storage and IC" scenario than in the "IC" scenario examined in Section 4.3, for both the countries, independent of the fuel scenario considered. Second, in France, producers are better off in the "IC" scenario, because thermal generators benefit from the peaks in demand that are smoothed by storage in the "Storage and IC" scenario. Finally, the owners of the interconnector between France and SEM have lower benefits when storage is in the system than in the "IC" scenario, since price differences between the two jurisdictions are smaller with storage, as discussed in section 5.3. The results for the other two scenarios are shown in Table C5 in Appendix C. We convert them into 2010 prices by using the consumer price index. Then we calculate the discounted cost of the investment assuming a life-cycle of 15 years. We assume that the costs of storage are paid by each country. As highlighted before, for this scenario we assume 0.5 GW and 11 GW of demand response (facilitated through storage) installed in SEM and France in 2030. The costs of storage, under these assumptions, varies between 13 and 19 €/GW. As result of different storage capacity installed, in SEM, the annual cost associated with an investment in battery storage with an interest rate of 6.58% and a loan of 15 years, varies between 6 and 10 millions. For France, the costs varies between 138 and 213 millions.
These assumptions makes the comparison with the investment in interconnection easier, but they must be considered an upper bound of the total costs. First, as discussed by La Monaca and Ryan (2017) , if the batteries are bought by the consumers through their saving accounts the interest rate that should be considered is close to 0.55%. Second, the consumers may invest in batteries well before 2030. As a robustness check, then, we assume the interest rate of 0.55% and we also assume that just 1/10 of the batteries are bought in 2030 in the two countries, considering that consumers start buying them from 2020. With these assumptions, costs scale down to less than 1 million for Irish consumers and to 9-14 millions for French consumers.
Comparing results in Table 12 to the cost assumptions, the investment in storage is profitable for consumers in both countries, even if we consider the high interest rate of 6.58% and that all the batteries are bought in 2030. As a result, rational consumers should invest in this technology; if policy makers do not undertake the investment in interconnection, welfare gains are of 17€/million for France and 19€/million for SEM in S2 in the case of the interest rate of 6.58%. However, this should be considered an upper bound, as not all consumers will actually invest in storage technology. In the reality, only some of the total consumers (i.e. consumers with high electricity use) are likely to undertake the investment in storage. However, the policy makers should be aware of the consumers' behaviour in particular when planning the investment in interconnection. 21
If the investment in interconnection is undertaken and storage is available, the final equilibrium is the one with both storage and interconnection, because of the consumers' choice of investing in batteries. Again, as an upper bound of the welfare changes in this case, France is negatively affected by the investment in interconnection (-21 €/million) and SEM has moderate welfare gains (21€/million). However, if the investment costs associated to the additional interconnection are taken into account (45-60 €million per year for each jurisdiction) welfare changes become negative in both juridictions.
As a result, if storage becomes available when the investment in additional interconnection between France and SEM has been already undertaken, generators and interconnection owner are not significantly affected in France, but has negative revenues in SEM.
However, the costs of investment in storage associated with the costs of additional interconnection generate welfare losses in both the countries, driven by the costs of interconnection.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper investigates how increased interconnection and the availability of demand response through storage impacts on welfare in Ireland and France in 2030 for three scenarios of fuel prices. The European power system analysed is one vision of how the power system in Europe may develop.
Our results show that, without taking investment costs into account, welfare increases in both SEM and France when a 700MW interconnector is added between the two systems.
Consumers, interconnector owners and renewable generators gain in this scenario, whereas thermal generators lose, because of increased imports from France.
As the policy makers have direct control on the investment in interconnection, they should be aware that under the considered assumptions, with the costs of the project equal to or greater than 45 €/million per year for each jurisdiction, the new interconnector does not bring overall welfare gains neither to the island of Ireland nor France, even if interconnector's owners and Irish consumers may partially benefit from this project.
Assuming that the costs of investment in additional interconnection are paid by the consumers in each jurisdiction with their electricity bills, Irish consumers still have a positive surplus in some of the scenarios considered (S1 and S2), but their surplus does not compensate the losses made by thermal generators. In S3 consumers' surplus becomes negative in SEM if consumers have to pay for interconnection.
In France, net welfare gains are not very large and they are offset by (half) the cost of building the IC.
Investment in storage has the potential to reduce wholesale electricity prices both in SEM and France.
In SEM, storage increases welfare in all the scenarios, also taking the costs of investment in this technology into account. The opposite would happen in France, where consumer surplus does not compensate the generators' losses in S1 and S3. France has moderate welfare gains with storage in S2 only, which becomes negative depending on the assumed interest rate on the cost of the investment.
Comparing the scenario with increased storage with the scenario of increased storage and additional interconnector, the interconnector owners and generators marginally increase their profits in both countries. However, their net revenues are significantly lower than in the scenario with only additional interconnection.
As a result, if storage becomes available at competitive prices when the investment in additional interconnection between France and SEM has already taken place generates welfare losses in both the countries.
Policy makers cannot prevent consumers from investing in storage, but they can control the investment in interconnection. As a result, if consumers invest in batteries (and they become available in the next 10 years at a price close to the one hypotized in our analysis) and the interconnection project is undertaken, the final equilibrium is not welfare improving. The consequences on consumers, generators and interconnectors'owners vary depending on the scenario considered.
Appendix A Generation
The following Tables show generation from thermal and renewable sources for SEM and France. In France, RES generation does not include nuclear generation. 193, 529 193, 551 22 193, 587 193, 573 193, 575 2 Storage 193, 540 193, 649 109 193, 653 193, 660 8 193, 673 193, 679 6 
